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THE INDUSTRI-PLEX MODEL: BENEFICIAL REUSE 
OF A SUPERFUND SITE 
Katherine Fairbanks* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Industri-Plex Superfund site in Woburn, Massachusetts has 
been labeled a Superfund success story. 1 The site, placed on the Na-
tional Priorities List (NPL)2 in 1983 as the fifth most contaminated 
site in the country,3 is undergoing a transformation: "Industri-Plex, 
once the site of animal-hide piles so rank they drove neighbors in-
doors, is slated to become a regional transportation center produc-
ing thousands of jobs in what the EPA hopes will be a model for 
the Superfund."4 When remediation is complete, the site will be the 
first example of the planned "beneficial reuse" of a Superfund site.5 
"Beneficial reuse," the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) 
buzzword for redevelopment, is part of the EPA's overall campaign to 
facilitate the "safe and sustainable reuse of idled and underutilized 
* Articles Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 1995-1996. 
1 See Richard Kindleberger, After the Spill is Gone, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 7, 1993, at AI; 
Woburn, Mass. Site to be Restored, Converted to Transportation Facility, Envtl. L. Update 
(BNA), Oct. 8, 1992, available in Westlaw BNA-NED database (Julie Belaga, EPA Region I 
Administrator, commenting: "[tlhis is the first time in the history of the superfund program that 
we are able to take a piece of property and restore it to productive use in the community .... 
We hope the efforts and design here will serve as a model for a nationwide effort to find ways 
to turn hazardous waste sites into usable property once they are cleaned up."); A Supe'/fund 
Success Story?, Greenwire, Oct. 6, 1992, available in Westlaw BNA-NED database. 
2 See infra text accompanying notes 25-31 for a description of the NPL. 
3 Amendments to National Oil and Hazardous Substance Contingency Plan; National Priori-
ties List, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,658 (1983) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). 
4 Scott Allen, Doubts Cast on Cleanup of Woburn Industrial Site, THE BOSTON GLOBE, June 
17, 1995, Metro/Region, at 1. 
5 See Kindleberger, supra note 1, at AI. 
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industrial and commercial facilities where redevelopment and expan-
sion are complicated by actual and perceived environmental contami-
nation."6 In the case of Industri-Plex, the anticipated redevelopment 
includes a regional transportation facility with a 2,500 car park-and-
ride center, commuter rail service, airport shuttle transportation, and, 
potentially, a vertiport for helicopter traveJ.7 
The location of Industri-Plex, in a thriving industrial area where 
there is little undeveloped land remaining, makes it a desirable target 
for developers.8 The most crucial factor in the reuse of the Industri-
Plex site, however, is not the character or location of the land. Rather, 
beneficial reuse is possible because of a settlement agreement reached 
between the EPA and the parties funding the cleanup9 and because 
of the EPA's plan to enter into a prospective purchaser agreement to 
relieve future owners of liability for pre-existing contamination at the 
site.10 By lifting the burden of liability that normally falls on current 
owners under § 107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA),l1 the EPA and the par-
ties funding the cleanup have made Industri-Plex property salable. 
The sale of the land, in turn, promises to generate revenues sufficient 
to pay taxes owed to the City of Woburn, costs incurred by the EPA 
and Massachusetts, and a portion of the costs of remediation assumed 
by the parties funding the cleanup.12 The framework for the beneficial 
reuse of Industri-Plex is the 1989 consent decree between the EPA, 
Massachusetts, and twenty-six defendants13 and the prospective pur-
chaser agreement between the EPA and the future owners of Indus-
tri-Plex.14 
6 Materials on EPA Initiative on.Administrative Ref 01"1'/'1,8 to Superfund, Daily Env't Rep., 
Feb. 17, 1995, available in Westlaw, BNA-DEN database. 
7 Kindleberger, supra note 1, at AI. 
8 Telephone interview with Daniel Winograd, Attorney, Environmental Protection Agency, 
Region I, (Apr. 1, 1995) [hereinafter Winograd interview]. 
9 See discussion infra section IV. 
10 See discussion infra section V. 
11 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988). CERCLA was promulgated in 1980, but subsequently 
was reauthorized and amended by a new act entitled "Superfund Amendments and Reauthori-
zation Act of 1986" (SARA). CERCLA as amended by SARA is codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 
(1988 & Supp. V 1993). Subsequent references to CERCLA will be deemed to incorporate the 
SARA amendments as well. 
12 See infra text accompanying section IV.C. 
13 United States v. Stauffer Chern. Co., No. 01-88-COV 3, 1989 EPA Consent LEXIS 137 
(Mass. Dist. Ct. Oct. 28, 1989) [hereinafter Consent Decree]. 
14 Proposed Administrative Settlement Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation, and Liability Act; In re: Industri-Plex Superfund Site; Woburn, MA, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 2,824 (1996) [hereinafter Settlement]. 
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Section II of this Comment provides an initial overview of CER-
CLA and its liability provisions that hinder the resale and reuse of 
Superfund sites like Industri-Plex. Section III presents a brief history 
of the Industri-Plex site, including the uses that ultimately caused the 
release of hazardous substances on the site, the discovery of the 
release, and the administrative actions that led to the 1989 consent 
decree. Section IV explains what a consent decree is and describes in 
detail the terms of the Industri-Plex consent decree. Section V de-
scribes the EPA's new policy on prospective purchaser agreements 
and the agreement proposed for Industri-Plex. Finally, Section VI 
discusses how the consent decree, as applied to the Industri-Plex site, 
and the prospective purchaser agreement, have solved the CERCLA 
liability problem and whether the combination of agreements will be 
a viable solution at other Superfund sites. 
II. OVERVIEW OF CERCLA 
CERCLA provides the EPA with the authority to respond to the 
release,15 or threatened release, into the environment of any hazard-
ous substance or "of any pollutant or contaminant which may present 
an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare."16 
Response on the part of the EPA may take the form of removaP7 or 
remedial action,18 or any other response measure consistent with the 
National Contingency Plan 19 that is necessary to protect the public 
15 "The term 'release' means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, 
discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment .... " 
CERCLA,42 U.S.C. § 9601(22). 
16Id. § 9604(a)(1). 
17 Removal actions are short-term responses to an emergency which may include "security 
fencing or other measures to limit access, provision of alternative water supplies, temporary 
evacuation and housing of threatened individuals not otherwise provided for .... " Id. 
§ 9601(23). 
18 Remedial action refers to actions taken to effect a permanent remedy. These actions may 
include: 
storage, confinement, perimeter protection using dikes, trenches, or ditches, clay cover, 
neutralization, cleanup of released hazardous substances and associated containment 
materials, recycling or reuse, diversion, destruction, segregation of reactive wastes, 
dredging or excavations, repair or replacement of leaking containers, collection of 
leachate and runoff, onsite treatment or incineration, provision of alternative water 
supplies, and any monitoring reasonably required to assure that such actions protect 
the public health and welfare and the environment. 
Id. § 9601(24). 
19 "National Contingency Plan" refers to the National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution 
Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-.920 (1995). The stated purpose of the "National Contin-
gency Plan" is "to provide the organizational structure and procedures for preparing for and 
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health or welfare or the environment.2o Where the EPA determines 
that the response action will be effected promptly and properly by 
the potentially responsible parties,21 the EPA may delegate its author-
ity to a potentially responsible party who has agreed to finance and 
perform the remediation.22 Alternatively, CERCLA authorizes the 
EPA to finance the cleanup through the "Hazardous Substance Su-
perfund,"23 a federally funded hazardous waste trust fund.24 Super-
fund resources only may be used, however, to finance remedial actions 
at sites that are included on the NPL.25 
The NPL is the list of sites where there have been releases, or 
threatened releases, of hazardous substances which warrant long-
term remedial evaluation and response.26 Congress, when it enacted 
CERCLA, mandated certain revisions to the National Contingency 
Plan, including the creation of a system to identify and list the sites 
where contamination is the most severe and remediation is most 
urgently needed.27 A site is placed on the NPL if it meets one of the 
following criteria: (1) the release28 scores sufficiently high on the Haz-
ard Ranking System;29 (2) a state has designated the site as its highest 
priority; or (3) both The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
responding to discharges of oil and releases of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contami-
nants." Id. § 300.I. 
20 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(I). 
21 The term "potentially responsible party" refers to any party that the EPA, in accordance 
with CERCLA's liability provisions, may pursue to conduct or finance the cleanup of a Super-
fund site. 40 C.F.R. § 35.6015(a)(32) (1994). 
22 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604. 
23 See id. § 9611. The EPA was authorized to use up to $8.5 billion for the five-year period 
beginning October 17, 1986 and up to $5.1 billion for the period commencing October 1, 1991 and 
ending September 30, 1994. Id. § 96U(a). These authorized funds "remain available until ex-
pended." Id. 
24 See I.R.C. § 9507 (1994) (provision creating Hazardous Substance Superfund). 
25 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1) (1994). 
26Id. § 300.425(b). 
27 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9605(8)(A)-(B). 
28 "Release," as used in the EPA's regulations implementing CERCLA, is synonymous with 
"facility" and "site." See Amendments to National Oil and Hazardous Substance Contingency 
Plan; National Priorities List, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,658 (1983) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). 
29 The Hazard Ranking System (HRS) is described in EPA regulations as follows: 
[t]he revised HRS evaluates four pathways: ground water, surface water, soil expo-
sure, and air. The HRS serves as a screening device to evaluate the relative potential 
of uncontrolled hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants to pose a threat to 
human health or the environment. Those sites that score 28.50 or greater on the HRS 
are eligible for the NPL. 
National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites, 60 Fed. Reg. 8,212 (1995) 
(proposed Feb. 13, 1995). 
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Registry30 and the EPA determine that the release poses a danger to 
public health and the EPA decides that remediation is the most cost-
effective response method.31 
The EPA, when it decides to take remedial action at a Superfund 
site, first will identify the potentially responsible parties who are 
tagged with liability by § 107 of CERCLA.32 Section 107 lists four 
categories of parties who are liable for response costs33 at a Superfund 
site: (1) the present owner or operator of a facility;34 (2) the owner or 
operator of a facility at the time of disposal of a hazardous substance; 
(3) any person who arranged for disposal or treatment of hazardous 
wastes owned or possessed by that person at a facility; and (4) any 
person who accepts or accepted hazardous substances for transport 
to a facility selected by that person.35 While CERCLA does not ex-
pressly provide for strict and joint and severalliability,36 the effect of 
CERCLA is to impose such liability on any party who falls within any 
of the four categories of liable persons.37 
The inclusion of the current owner of a facility in the list of liable 
parties poses a particular threat to potential purchasers of Superfund 
30 The Agency for Toxic Substances (ATSDR) was created in CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(1). 
The ATSDR is charged with effectuating and implementing "the health related activities of 
[CERCLA]." Id. Specific mandates of ATSDR include establishing a national registry of serious 
disease and illness, establishing a national registry of individuals who have been exposed to 
toxic substances, compiling a comprehensive list of areas where toxic releases have resulted in 
closure or restricted access, preparing, and annually updating, a list of hazardous substances 
most commonly found at NPL sites, and performing a health assessment for each NPL site. Id. 
§§ 9604(i)(1)-(6). 
31 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(c) (1994). 
32 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. 
33 "Response costs" include all costs of removal or remediation action by the EPA, a state, or 
an indian tribe that are not inconsistent with the National Contingency Plan; any other neces-
sary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the National Contingency 
Plan; costs associated with natural resources damage or assessments; costs of required human 
health assessments; and interest accruing on any of these response costs. Id. § 9607(a)(4). 
34 "Facility means (A) any building, structure, installation, equipment, pipe or pipeline ... , 
well, pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch, landfill, storage container, motor vehicle, rolling 
stock, or aircraft, or (E) any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, 
stored, disposed of, or placed, or otherwise come to be located .... " Id. § 9601(9). 
35Id. § 9607(a). 
36 CERCLA's guidance with respect to the interpretation of "liable" or "liability" is limited to 
the statement that these terms will be construed according to the standard of liability under 
§ 1321 of the Clean Air Act. CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32). 
37 E.g., Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 841 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 
sub nom. Mumaw v. Nurad, Inc., 506 U.S. 940 (1992); United States v. R.w. Meyer, Inc., 889 
F.2d 1497, 1506-07 (6th Cir. 1989); United States v. Monsanto, 858 F.2d 160, 167-72 (4th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106 (1988). 
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sites.38 In New York v. Shore Realty Corp., the United States Court 
of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied strict liability to hold the 
current owner liable for response costS.39 The owner had purchased 
the land for real estate development and knew at the time of purchase 
that the land had been used by its prior owners to store hazardous 
waste.40 In reaching its conclusion, the court stated, "[w]e agree with 
the State ... that [§ 107(a)(1)] unequivocally imposes strict liability 
on the current owner of a facility from which there is a release or 
threat of release, without regard to causation."41 The significance of 
this holding is that the current owner of property may have to pay 
for the cleanup of hazardous wastes which were generated entirely 
by a prior owner.42 
The only defenses to CERCLA liability are those specifically enu-
merated in CERCLA.43 These statutory defenses absolve a defendant 
of liability in certain circumstances which must be proven by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence.44 To successfully invoke a statutory de-
fense, the defendant must show that the release or threat of release 
of a hazardous substance and the resultant damages were caused 
solely by: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of war; or (3) an act or omission 
by a third party other than an employee of the defendant, or one in a 
direct or indirect contractual relationship with the defendant.45 The 
third defense, known as the "innocent purchaser defense," appears to 
release from liability a person who purchased the property after it 
had been contaminated by the previous owner.46 CERCLA's definition 
of "contractual relationships," however, drastically diminishes appli-
cation of the innocent purchaser defense.47 Contractual relationships 
under CERCLA include "land contracts, deeds, or other instruments 
transferring title or possession," unless the purchaser seeking to in-
voke the defense can establish by a preponderance of the evidence 
that, even after making all appropriate inquiries into the previous 
38 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1). 
39 New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1037 (2d Cir. 1985). 
4°ld. 
411d. at 1044. 
42 See id. at 1037. See generally Michael A. Bell, Note, The Effect of Superfund Liability on 
Property "Owners," 92 W. VA. L. REV. 125 (1989); Diana L. McDavid, Note, Liabilities of the 
Innocent Current Owner of Toxic Property Under CERCLA, 23 U. RICH. L. REV. 403 (1989). 
43 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). 
441d. § 9607(b). 
451d. §§ 9607(b)(1)-(3). 
46 See id. § 9607(b)(3). 
47 See id. § 9601(35)(A). 
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ownership and uses of the property, the purchaser had no reason to 
know that any hazardous substances had been disposed of at the site.48 
The "innocent purchaser defense," therefore, is not available to a 
purchaser with any prior knowledge of a release or potential release.49 
Because "congressional intent to impose liability on the blamewor-
thy is achieved imperfectlY,"5o CERCLA's liability provisions raise 
several concerns for the prospective purchaser of a Superfund site. 
First, if a party purchases a property before remediation is complete, 
the party becomes a current owner and, as such, becomes a liable 
party from whom the EPA may seek to recover response costS.51 
Second, even if the party is willing to wait until the EPA has certified 
that the remediation process is complete, there is no guarantee that 
the EPA will not, at some future time, decide that further remediation 
is necessary and force the current owner to bear the costS.52 Even 
after the EPA has deleted a site from the NPL and listed the site on 
its Construction Completion List,53 potential liability still adheres to 
the site, as the inclusion of a site on the Construction Completion List 
has no legal significance. 54 
Finally, situations occur in which a party purchases a Superfund 
site for industrial reuse and, through that use, aggravates or contrib-
utes to the existing contamination at the site.55 In this case, there is 
nothing to prevent the EPA from pursuing cleanup costs from the 
current owner.56 Each of these scenarios is theoretically possible, but 
48 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A). The "innocent purchaser defense" also can be invoked 
where the defendant is a governmental entity which acquired the facility by escheat, through 
involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through eminent domain, or where the defendant ac-
quired the facility by inheritance or bequest. Id. §§ 9601(35)(A)(ii)-(iii). 
49Id. § 9607(b)(3). 
50 Thaddeus Bereday, Contractual Transfers of Liability Under CERCLA Section 107(e)(1): 
For Enforcement of Private Risk Allocations in Real Property Transactions, 43 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 161, 175 (1992). 
51 Winograd interview, supra note 8. 
52Id. 
53 Sites qualify for the Construction Completion List when: "(1) any necessary physical 
cleanup levels or other requirements have been achieved; (2) the EPA has determined that the 
response action should be limited to measures that do not involve construction [e.g., institutional 
controls, see infra note 137]; or (3) the site qualifies for deletion from the NPL," because the 
EPA has determined that no further response action is appropriate under Superfund. National 
Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites, 60 Fed. Reg. 8,212, 8,213 (1995) (pro-
posed Feb. 13, 1995). 
54 Id. 
55 Winograd interview, supra note 8. 
56 Id. 
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unlikely to occur. 57 Nevertheless, in light of the fact that CERCLA 
includes current owners in its list ofliable parties and caps the liability 
of an owner at the total of all costs of response plus $50 million, the 
small chance that a new owner will be held liable for response costs 
is a risk sufficient to deter prospective purchasers.58 The prospective 
purchaser's fear of incurring response costs is not unreasonable: ac-
cording to EPA estimates, the average cost per site for remedial 
planning and feasibility studies, the remedial action itself, and main-
tenance of the remedial measures, is approximately $30 million.59 One 
commentator summarized the dilemma that prospective purchasers 
face: "[a]lthough relatively few industrial sites are so contaminated as 
to become candidates for the Superfund cleanup list, the costs associ-
ated with such a cleanup are so overwhelming that no reasonable 
purchaser would risk incurring what amounts to an open-ended con-
tingent liability."60 
Another problem for prospective purchasers of Superfund sites is 
that, in the event the EPA chooses to pursue them for response costs, 
the new owners would be foreclosed from invoking the "innocent 
purchaser defense."61 Inclusion of a site on the NPL constitutes public 
notice of the presence of hazardous wastes at that site.62 Anyone who 
purchased property on a Superfund site would be presumed to know 
that there had been a release, or threat of release, of a hazardous 
substance on that site.63 This knowledge destroys the "innocent pur-
chaser defense," which is only available to those who diligently inves-
tigate the site and yet fail to discover that there has been a hazardous 
substance disposed of at the site.64 
A final point regarding the "absolute" quality of CERCLA liability 
is that all forms of cost allocation agreements between private par-
ties65 are unavailing when it comes to cost recovery actions by the 
57Id. 
58 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a)(I), (c)(I)(D). 
59 National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous Waste Sites, 60 Fed. Reg. 8,212, 8,216 
(1995) (proposed Feb. 13, 1995). 
60 Gail V. Karlsson, The Impact of Environmental Liabilities on Real Estate Contract Nego-
tiations, 8 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 37, 39 (1990) (footnotes omitted). 
61 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), 9607(b)(3). 
62 Amendments to National Oil and Hazardous Substance Contingency Plan; National Priori-
ties List, 48 Fed. Reg. 40,658, 40,659 (1983) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 300). 
63 See National Priorities List of Uncontrolled Hazardous Substances, 60 Fed. Reg. 8,212, 
8,213-14 (1995) (Feb. 13, 1995). 
64 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(35)(A), 9607(b)(3). 
65 These agreements may take the form of an indemnification or hold harmless agreement, or 
an "as is" clause incorporated in a purchase and sale agreement. Bereday, supra note 50, at 
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government.66 A buyer may negotiate an agreement that shifts CER-
CLA costs to the seller, but the buyer, at the EPA's discretion, still 
may be held liable under CERCLA § 107 for any necessary remedial 
or response action at the site.67 In the event the EPA chooses to 
pursue the buyer, the agreement between the buyer and seller simply 
gives the buyer the right to seek reimbursement from the seller.68 
From the buyer's perspective, this arrangement is obviously flawed: 
"[i]f the burdened party breaches the agreement or becomes insol-
vent, the original allocation of liability provided by [CERCLA] re-
mains unaltered."69 
Because of CERCLA's stringent liability provisions, Superfund sites 
are not attractive to developers and are instead "cleaned up, fenced 
in, and abandoned."70 Representative Michael G. Oxley (R-Ohio), Chair-
man of the House Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and 
Hazardous Materials,71 commented on the need to reform CERCLA 
to encourage redevelopment of abandoned industrial property and 
noted, "we are failing to recycle one of the most valuable resources 
we have."72 It is difficult to know how many sites remain untenanted, 
undeveloped, and unutilized. According to Larry Eastep, the manager 
of remedial project management for the Illinois Environmental Pro-
tection Agency, as of March, 1995, there were at least 5,000 aban-
doned, contaminated industrial sites in Illinois alone.73 In the case of 
163--64. As Bereday explains in his overview of private cost allocation agreements, "[ w ]hether 
these or other legal terms are used, the intent of the agreements is to distribute liability risks 
between the contracting parties through private negotiations." Id. at 165 (footnotes omitted). 
66 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(I); Niecko v. Emro Mktg. Co., 973 F.2d 1296, 1300 (6th 
Cir. 1992) (holding that § 107(e)(I) of CERCLA allows private parties to allocate cleanup costs 
between themselves, but does not allow the transfer of liability); Mardan v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 
804 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1986) (noting that "arrangements apportioning CERCLA liabilities 
between private 'responsible parties' . . . cannot prejudice the right of the government to 
recover cleanup or closure costs from any ... party"). 
67 See CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e)(I); Niecko, 973 F.2d at 1300; Mardan, 804 F.2d at 1459. 
This is the nature of a private cost allocation agreement: "[p]rivate cost allocations impose 
obligations on the parties who negotiate the agreement. However, the buyer and seller cannot 
bind the rights of the government or other third parties, such as the next generation of 
purchasers." Bereday, supra note 50, at 198. 
68 Bereday, supra note 50, at 198. 
69Id. 
70 Kindleberger, supra note 1, at AI. 
71 This subcommittee has primary jurisdiction within the House of Representatives over 
Superfund. Andrew M. Ballard, Superfund: Overhaul of Superfund Law Necessary to Foster 
Redevelopment, Member Says, Daily Env't Rep. (BNA), Mar. 29, 1995, available in Westlaw, 
BNA-DEN database. 
72 Id. 
73 Illinois: Chicago Launches Study of Reuse of Contaminated Industrial Sites, Daily Env't 
Rep. (BNA), Dec. 19, 1994, available in Westlaw, BNA-DEN database. 
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Superfund sites, the danger to human health and the environment has 
been minimized through remedial action, but the specter of CERCLA 
liability still deters developers from purchasing remediated Super-
fund sites. The Industri-Plex Superfund site in Woburn, Massachu-
setts is being remediated under a plan that will circumvent the trend 
toward disuse and abandonment and instead will promote the beneficial 
reuse of Superfund sites. 
III. INDUSTRI -PLEX: HISTORY OF THE SITE 
The EP.Ns 1986 Record of Decision (ROD) begins with the following 
description of Industri-Plex: 
[t]he Industri-Plex Site is a 245-acre industrial park located in 
Woburn, Massachusetts, ... an old industrial community located 
approximately ten miles northwest of Boston. Primarily known 
for its tannery industry at the turn of the century, Woburn is 
presently experiencing an economic revitalization with the infu-
sion of a number of computer and service-related businesses. The 
intersection of two major highways, Route 128 traversing east to 
west and Route 93 oriented north and south, has turned the 
northeastern third of the city into a commercial/industrial area.74 
In the ten years that have passed since the EPA prepared its ROD, 
Woburn and other cities along Route 128 have remained important 
players in the ongoing technology boom.75 A February, 1996 article in 
The Boston Globe discussed the tremendous volume of traffic on Route 
12876 and the development that has created the congestion.77 The 
Route 128 corridor plays an important role in the state's economy: 
John R. Regan, executive director of the Massachusetts Office of 
Business Development, stresses that Route 128 today is an en-
gine that drives the state's efforts to attract new businesses. The 
"Greater Boston Metro Area," which includes Boston and Route 
128 to the ocean, accounts for more than 50% of the state's gross 
domestic product .... 78 
74 Industri-Plex Record of Decision, EPA-ID MAD076580950, "Site Location and Descrip-
tion," Sept. 30, 1986, available in LEXIS, Envirn library, Rods file [hereinafter ROD]. The ROD 
is unpaginated. Therefore, cites to the ROD do not include page numbers, but reference instead 
the descriptive title of the section from which the information is taken. 
75 See Alice Hinkle & Diana Brown, Route 128: 60 Years of Stop and Go, THE BOSTON GLOBE, 
Feb. 25, 1996, West Suburban Weekly, at 1, 10. 
76 The article noted that the stretch of Route 128 that runs through Woburn has average daily 
traffic of approximately 190,000 vehicles. That figure puts Route 128 in the running for "the 
dubious title as the state's busiest highway." Id. 
77 Id. 
78Id. 
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The Industri-Plex site will resume its place on the "Technology High-
way"79 after the current remediation effort is complete, and the con-
tamination of more than a century of industrial operations finally is 
brought under control. 
The evolution of the Industri-Plex site in Woburn, Massachusetts 
from raw, undeveloped land to a seriously contaminated Superfund 
site began in 1853 with the establishment of The Woburn Chemical 
Works.80 The Woburn Chemical Works manufactured chemicals for 
the local textile, leather, and paper industries until 1863, when the 
Merrimac Chemical Company (Merrimac) replaced The Woburn Chemi-
cal Works at the site.81 Merrimac's main products were sulfuric acid 
and related chemicals.82 In 1899, Merrimac purchased the William H. 
Swift Company and became the leading producer of arsenic insecti-
cides.83 In 1915, Merrimac organized a separate company which also 
operated on the site and produced organic chemicals, including phe-
nol, benzene, picric acid, toluene, and trinitrotoluene (TNT).84 Mon-
santo Chemical Works (Monsanto) of St. Louis, Missouri purchased 
the Merrimac operations in 1929 and continued production at Indus-
tri-Plex until 193V5 The wastes generated by the industrial activities 
between 1853 and 1931 were disposed of randomly over a wide area 
and were used for two purposes: (1) to fill lowlands, wetlands, and 
shallow ponds in order to provide more usable land for further indus-
trial use; and (2) as construction material to build dikes and levees to 
contain liquid wastes.86 
The second wave of hazardous waste contamination at Industri-
Plex began in 1934, when New England Chemical Industries pur-
chased the site and constructed an animal hide glue manufacturing 
plant.87 The plant operated under several different owners from 1935 
until 1969.88 The gluemaking process entailed the extraction of colla-
gen from animal tissue.89 This process involved cooking raw, salted or 
79 "Technology Highway" is one of many descriptive names applied to Route 128 over the 
years. Id. 
80 ROD, supra note 74, "Site History." 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. 
85 ROD, supra note 74, "Site History." 
8fJId. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
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limed hides, hide fleshings, or chrome tanned leather scraps from 
cattle, hogs, and sheep in hot water.90 The material remaining in the 
tank after cooking the raw materials and drawing off the glue con-
sisted of wood shavings, raw products, and hide materials and was 
called "tankage."91 The tankage was buried on the Industri-Plex site, 
in some cases directly on top of materials left behind from Merrimac's 
on-site disposal.92 
In 1968, the Mark-Phillip Trust, a real estate development trust, 
purchased approximately 120 acres of the 245-acre Industri-Plex site.93 
In the early 1970s, the Mark-Phillip Trust began filling and excavating 
portions of the property to facilitate the sale of various parcels.94 In 
1975, excavation by the Mark-Phillip Trust reached the buried tank-
age which, having been unearthed, released a pungent "rotten egg" 
odor into the surrounding areas.95 The prevailing wind direction car-
ried the odor to towns east of Woburn, where it became known as the 
"Woburn Odor."96 Despite the pervasive odor, the Mark-Phillip Trust 
continued to excavate the glue wastes and pile them on the sides of a 
small pond in a corner of the site.97 These stockpiles came to be known 
as the "hide piles" and during the excavation reached dimensions of 
40 feet high, 250 feet long, and 100 feet wide.98 The odor problem was 
so severe that workers reported episodes of becoming physically ill 
and there were continuous complaints to state regulatory agencies 
regarding the obnoxious odor and the severe headaches and nausea 
it caused.99 Even six years after active excavation ceased, the odor 
emanating from the hide piles still affected surrounding areas when-
ever the hide piles were disturbed. l °O 
In 1977, the Suffolk County Superior Court issued an order prohib-
iting the Mark-Phillip Trust from disturbing two small sections of the 
site where the EPA believed the remaining glue wastes were concen-
trated.101 The order only partially achieved the desired containment 
90 ROD, supra note 74, "Site History." 
91 [d. 
92 [d. 
93 Winograd interview, supra note 8. 
94 ROD, supra note 74, "Site History." 
95 [d. 
96 [d. 
9'1 [d. 
98 [d. 
99 ROD, supra note 74, "Alternatives Evaluation." 
100 [d. 
101 ROD, supra note 74, "Site History." 
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of the wastes, since the stockpiles continued to generate and release 
substantial amounts of hydrogen sulfide even while undisturbed.102 
In 1979, the United States Attorney's Office, on behalf of the United 
States Army Corps of Engineers and the EPA, brought an action 
against the Mark-Phillip Trust for wetlands violations.1°S An injunc-
tion was issued and further development activity stopped.104 In May, 
1985, both state and federal consent decrees were approved by the 
respective courtS.105 These consent decrees required the Mark-Phillip 
Trust to investigate the nature and extent of the hazardous waste 
problems and to resolve the wetlands filling issues.106 In exchange, the 
Mark-Phillip Trust would be able to develop and sell certain portions 
of the site in order to provide funding for continued remedial inves-
tigations and cleanup.107 The Mark-Phillip Trust, due to insufficient 
financial resources, has never effectuated the terms of the 1985 state 
and federal consent decrees. lOB A separate consent decree, pursuant 
to which the responsible parties are currently cleaning up the Indus-
tri-Plex site, was finalized in 1989.109 
IV. INDUSTRI-PLEX: THE 1989 CONSENT DECREE 
Settlement under CERCLA is governed by § 122.110 Under § 122, 
the EPA has discretion to enter into a settlement agreement with any 
person to perform a response action at a Superfund site, provided that 
the agreement is in the public interest and is consistent with the 
National Contingency Plan.111 The settlement agreement must be en-
tered in the appropriate United States district court as a consent 
decree.112 As such, the consent decree constitutes a "judgment"113 
binding the parties who sign the decree; CERCLA specifies, however, 
that participation in a consent decree is not tantamount to an admis-
sion of liability.u4 CERCLA itself does not outline the structure of a 
l02Id. 
103Id. 
l04Id. 
105Id. 
106 ROD, supra note 74, "Site History." 
l07Id. 
l08Id. 
109 See generally Consent Decree, supra note 13. 
110 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9622. 
111 Id. § 9622(a). 
l12Id. § 9622(d)(I)(A). 
113 See id. §§ 9622(2)(A)-(B) (referring to the consent decree as a "final judgment"). 
114Id. § 9622(a)(I)(B). 
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consent decree.n5 CERCLA § 122(c)(1), however, does call for the 
inclusion of a covenant not to sue to limit the liability of the parties 
to the agreement.116 The decision as to whether to include a covenant 
not to sue, as well as what the scope of that covenant should be, 
resides in the EPA.l17 The covenant not to sue, whatever its scope, 
only inures to the benefit of those parties who sign the consent decree 
and only protects those parties against certain actions brought by the 
United States.118 The covenant not to sue, as a general rule, does not 
extend to actions brought by the United States to recover costs or 
damages not included in the consent decree119 or to "liability premised 
upon conditions that were unknown" as of the date the consent decree 
became effective.l20 For a covenant not to sue to become effective, the 
EPA first must certify that the remedial action at the site has been 
completed successfully.121 Even after the EPA "launches" the cove-
nant not to sue by certifying that remediation is complete, a poten-
tially responsible party who is not a signatory to the consent decree 
remains subject to the full panorama of liability under CERCLA 
§ 107.122 
The 1989 Industri-Plex consent decree constitutes settlement of 
two suits: the first, a suit brought by the United States, on behalf of 
the EPA, pursuant to §§ 106-07 ofCERCLA/23 and § 7003 of the Solid 
Waste Disposal Act (SWDA);124 and the second, a suit brought by the 
115 In 1991 the EPA published a Model Consent Decree in the Federal Register. Model 
CERCLA RDIRA Consent Decree, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,996 (1991). The stated goal of the Model 
Consent Decree is "to achieve a greater number of settlements in a more expeditious manner, 
on terms acceptable to the United States and consistent with the intent of CERCLA, thereby 
permitting more remedial work to proceed." Id. 
116 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(c)(I). 
117 Id. §§ 9622(c)(I), (f)(I). Factors bearing on that discretionary decision include: (1) whether 
the consent decree promotes the public's interest in expeditious, properly executed response 
actions; and (2) whether the beneficiary of the covenant not to sue has complied with the terms 
of existing consent decrees. Id. §§ 9622(f)(1)(A)-(D). 
118Id. §§ 9622(c)(1)-(2). 
119Id. § 9622(e)(2)(A). 
12°Id. § 9622(f)(6). "In extraordinary circumstances," the EPA may choose to extend the 
covenant not to sue to liability arising from unknown conditions. Id. § 9622(f)(6)(B). In general, 
this extremely broad covenant not to sue will be granted only where the "terms, conditions, or 
requirements of the [consent decree] ... are sufficient to provide all reasonable assurances that 
public health and the environment will be protected from any future releases at ... the facility." 
Id. 
121 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9622(f)(3). 
122 Id. §§ 9607(a), 9622(c)(2). 
123 Id. §§ 9606-07. 
124 SWDA, 42 U.S.C. § 6973. 
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Commonwealth of Massachusetts (Massachusetts) pursuant to § 107 
of CERCLA and numerous state law provisions.125 Under the terms 
of the consent decree, twenty-five of the twenty-six responsible par-
ties agreed to conduct the remediation and to be perpetually liable for 
future response costs at the site.126 The consent decree requires that 
these twenty-five defendants make payments to a Remedial Trust.127 
Their payments are then disbursed by the trustee of the Remedial 
Trust, as necessary, to finance the remediation.128 The final responsible 
party, the Mark-Phillip Trust, agreed to convey all of its holdings in 
the Industri-Plex site to a Custodial Trust.129 Upon completion of the 
remedial action, the Custodial Trust will sell the Mark-Phillip Trust 
property, with the proceeds to be distributed to the City of Woburn, 
the United States, Massachusetts, and ultimately, to the settling de-
fendants. 13o The results of the remedial action will be preserved through 
"Institutional Controls"-covenants that require the maintenance of 
certain remedies and bind all future owners of the property.13l The 
following subsections describe in detail the terms of the Industri-Plex 
consent decree that govern the remediation at the site. 
A. Responsibilities of Settling Defendants Under 
the Consent Decree 
The consent decree imposes a joint and several obligation on all 
settling defendants,132 except the Mark-Phillip Trust, to finance and 
perform the remedial work at Industri-Plex and to reimburse the 
125 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *1-*3. Massachusetts's suit was based on the following 
state laws: The Massachusetts Clean Water Act, MASS GEN. L. ch. 21 § 27(14) (1994); The 
Massachusetts Hazardous Waste Management Act, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21C (1994); The Massa-
chusetts Oil and Hazardous Material Release Prevention and Response Act, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 
21E (1994); The Massachusetts Solid Waste Management Act, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 21H (1994). 
Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *2, *78. 
126 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *16-*22. 
127 The Remedial Trust, created pursuant to the terms of the consent decree, manages the 
financial aspects of the remediation. See infra section IV.B and accompanying text. 
128 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *24-*25. 
129 The Custodial Trust was established, as required by the terms of the consent decree, to 
hold and manage the Mark-Phillip Trust property during remediation and to supervise the 
eventual sale of the property. See infra section IV.C and accompanying text. 
130 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *26-*39. 
131 Id. at *42-*45. See infra note 137 for definition of Institutional Controls. 
132 "Settling defendants" refers to the potentially responsible parties identified by the EPA 
in accordance with § 9607 of CERCLA who became the defendants in the EPA's suit to compel 
settlement and who ultimately signed the consent decree. See Consent Decree, supra note 13, 
at *1-*7. 
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EPA and Massachusetts for response costS.133 The Mark-Phillip Trust, 
which did not have the financial resources to make a direct contribu-
tion to the costs of remediation, agreed instead to convey all of its 
holdings in Industri-Plex to the Custodial Trust. l34 The proceeds from 
the sale of the Mark-Phillip Trust property by the Custodial Trust will 
help to finance the remediation.135 The remedial work to be performed 
at the site by the settling defendants will provide for the containment 
and treatment of hazardous substances.136 This work includes the 
following elements: 
(1) surface cleanup/surface preparations; 
(2) design and construction of a cap or caps over areas of the Site 
found to contain contamination; 
(3) regrading or restructuring and capping of certain portions of 
the "hide piles"; 
(4) design and construction of an impermeable cap and a venting 
and air pollution control system for the East hide pile; 
(5) design and implementation of a Groundwater/Surface Water 
Investigation Plan to examine whether or to what extent Hazard-
ous Substances at the site contaminate or threaten to contaminate 
groundwater and/or surface water; 
(6) design of Institutional Controls137 to ensure that activities on 
the Site will not impair the effectiveness of the remedy; 
(7) design and operation of an interim groundwater remedy ... 
and operation and maintenance of the interim groundwater rem-
edy for the time required to achieve the performance standards 
approved or developed by the EPA ... ; and 
(8) Long-term Operation and Maintenance (including monitor-
ing).138 
The consent decree assigns sole responsibility for the performance 
of the remedial work to Monsantol39-the settling defendant who 
133 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *17. 
134 Winograd interview, supra note 8. 
135 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *30-*39. 
136 [d. at *18. The tenn "Hazardous Substances," for purposes of the Industri-Plex consent 
decree, includes odors emanating from the Hide Piles. [d. at *9. 
137 "Institutional Controls" refers to the land use restrictions and other regulations or controls 
designed to preserve and prevent the disturbance of the caps and other structures that will be 
constructed at the site as part of the work, as well as other ground-covering structures which 
already exist at the site and serve the same purpose as a cap. [d. at *9-*10. 
138 [d. at *18-*19. The consent decree defines Long-Tenn Operation and Maintenance as "all 
activities required under the Operation and Maintenance Plan as approved or developed by 
Plaintiffs [the EPA and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts] pursuant to this Consent De-
cree." [d. at *10. 
139 [d. at *18-*19. Monsanto, however, does not have sole responsibility for the Inauguration 
of Institutional Controls. [d. at *18. See infra note 205 for definition of Inauguration of Institu-
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agreed to pay approximately fifty percent of the costS.140 If Monsanto 
is unable or refuses to perform any part of the remedial work, the 
responsibility devolves upon the other settling defendants (excluding 
the Mark-Phillip Trust, whose contribution is limited to the convey-
ance of its property to the Custodial Trust).141 The settling defendants, 
before commencing the remedial work, were required to provide as-
surance of their financial ability to complete the work and to pay any 
claims arising from the performance of the work.l42 Additionally, within 
thirty days of entering into the consent decree, the settling defen-
dants were required to reimburse the EPA and Massachusetts for 
costs incurred for remedial actions that predated the consent de-
cree.143 As the remedial work progresses, the settling defendants must 
continue to reimburse the EPA and Massachusetts for all oversight 
costs-those costs associated with (1) reviewing and monitoring the 
work and (2) developing the plan for the Institutional Controls and 
any necessary additional remedial action.144 The settling defendants 
also agreed to indemnify the EPA and Massachusetts for all causes of 
action arising on account of the acts or omissions of the settling 
defendants (or any person acting on the settling defendants' behalf) 
in carrying out their responsibilities under the consent decree.145 
The terms of the consent decree, including the obligations of the 
settling defendants to finance and perform the work, are binding upon 
the settling defendants' successors and assigns.146 In addition, the 
consent decree provides that certain requirements will run with the 
land and bind successors-in-title.147 As used in the consent decree, 
tional Controls. Each settling defendant or successor-in-title that is a landowner at the time 
specified for the Inauguration of Institutional Controls must finance and perform the Inaugu-
ration of Institutional Controls. Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *20. 
140 David Rotman, Major Superfund Cleanups OK'D, CHEMICAL WEEK Assocs., Feb. 15, 
1989, at 15. 
141 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *19. Hereinafter, the term "settling defendants" will 
refer to all settling parties except the Mark-Phillip Trust whose obligations under the consent 
decree are limited, effectively, to conveyance of its property to the Custodial Trust. 
142 [d. at *22-*23. This financial assurance may take the form of a performance bond, a letter 
of credit, a guarantee by a third party, or internal financial statements (renewed annually) from 
Monsanto or from a group of the settling defendants. [d. 
143 [d. at *65-*66. 
144 [d. at *66. 
145 [d. at *67-*68. As a necessary corollary to the settling defendants' agreement to perform 
the remedial work and to indemnify the EPA and Massachusetts, the consent decree mandates 
that the settling defendants take out $10 million of comprehensive general liability and automo-
bile insurance and maintain that insurance for the duration of the remediation. [d. at *68-*69. 
146 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *13. 
147 [d. at *44, *54. 
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"successor-in-title" means "any person who acquires any possessory 
interest in any property included in the Site, other than a person who 
acquires a possessory interest solely to protect a security interest in 
the property and who has not exercised any right to enter or pos-
sess the property."l48 The covenants that run with the land and bind 
successors-in-title are: (1) the requirement to maintain Institutional 
Controls;149 and (2) the requirement to provide access to the EPA, 
Massachusetts, the settling defendants, and their representatives and 
contractors, where necessary to carry out the terms of the consent 
decree.15o To ensure that future owners of the land have notice of the 
restrictions imposed on the land, the consent decree requires that the 
settling defendants who are landowners record notice of the restric-
tions at the Registry of Deeds.151 All subsequent deeds must reference 
the recorded location of these restrictions.l52 The requirement of re-
corded notice of Institutional Controls is preserved until the EPA and 
Massachusetts determine that Institutional Controls are no longer 
necessary and record a notice to that effect.153 
Liability imposed on the settling defendants by the consent decree 
includes an obligation to pay stipulated penalties.154 Stipulated penal-
ties are fines for failure to complete work according to the timeline 
agreed upon.1OO The consent decree calls for a fine of $750 per day 
where the settling defendants fail to comply with certain provisions 
of the consent decreel56 or fail to timely complete the "minor mile-
stones" established by the Remedial Design! Action Plan.157 The fines 
increase for noncompliance with certain other sections158 of the con-
148 [d. at *13. 
149 [d. at *42-*45. 
150 [d. at *53-*57. 
151 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *44, *53-*55. The Mark-Phillip Trust was required to 
record the notice of Institutional Controls and related covenants before conveying its property 
interests to the Custodial Trust. [d. at *44. 
152 [d. at *44. 
153 [d. 
154 [d. at *74-*76. 
155 [d. at *74-*75. 
156 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *74. The relevant sections of the consent decree are: 
Section VIII ("Assurance of Ability to Complete Work"), Section XI ("Designation of Coordi-
nator"), and Section XIII ("Progress Reports"). [d. 
157 [d. at *74-*75. The Remedial Design/Action Plan "describe[s] studies, plans, and remedial 
actions to be undertaken at or with respect to the Site." [d. at *12. 
158 [d. at *74-*75. The relevant sections of the consent decree are: Section XIV ("Other Plans, 
Reports and Items Requiring Agency Approval"), Section XIX ("Reimbursement of Response 
Costs"), and Section XXVI.A ("Access to Information"). [d. 
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sent decree or for failure to timely complete the "major milestones" 
set forth in the Remedial Design/Action Plan.159 Of all stipulated pen-
alties incurred by the settling defendants, one-half are payable to the 
EPA and one-half to Massachusetts.16o 
If the matter which triggers the stipulated penalties is disputed by 
the settling defendants, the stipulated penalties continue to accrue 
but payment is stayed pending resolution of the matter.l6l A June, 
1995 article in The Boston Globe reported that "[m]ore than ten years 
into its cleanup job, the [remediation] company has not been penalized 
by the EPA once."162 The article, however, recounted an employee's 
story which, if true, could lead to penalties.163 The employee, a tech-
nician involved in excavating contaminated soil at the site, reported 
that he returned unexpectedly one night to the Industri-Plex site and 
witnessed the night crew pumping arsenic-contaminated water into a 
drainage ditch bound for the Mystic River.164 
A separate schedule of stipulated penalties applies to situations 
where any settling defendant who owns land in Industri-Plex or any 
successor-in-title fails to comply with requirements (1) to maintain 
institutional controls; (2) to provide access to the property to the 
EPA, Massachusetts, and the settling defendants and their repre-
sentatives; or (3) to record notices of covenants to provide access.165 
159 [d. at *12. The fines are calculated according to the following table: 
Time Elapsed Penalty per day 
1st thru 7th day $ 1,500.00 
8th thru 14th day $ 2,500.00 
15th thru 28th day $ 4,000.00 
29th thru 60th day $ 6,000.00 
Beyond sixty days $ 10,000.00 
[d. at *75. 
160 [d. 
161 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *73. 
162 Allen, supra note 4, at 1. The company hired by the settling defendants to lead the cleanup 
is Rust Utilities, an Alabama-based company. [d. 
163 [d. 
164 [d. 
165 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *75. Noncompliance by settling defendants or succes-
sors-in-title with these requirements will incur penalty fines as follows: 
Time Elapsed Penalty per day 
1st thru 7th day $ 750.00 
8th thru 14th day $ 1,500.00 
15th thru 28th day $ 2,500.00 
29th thru 60th day $ 4,000.00 
Beyond sixty days $ 8,000.00 
[d. 
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The per day stipulated penalty is assessed for the first day of noncom-
pliance and for each day thereafter that noncompliance continues.166 
The section of the consent decree entitled "Covenants Not to Sue 
by Plaintiffs" constitutes the only curtailment of the settling defen-
dants' perpetual and joint and several liability. 167 Under this section 
of the consent decree, the United States and Massachusetts agree not 
to sue the settling defendants or persons acting on their behalf for 
"Covered Matters."168 "Covered Matters" include: (1) liability to the 
United States arising under §§ 106 and 107(a) of CERCLA and § 7003 
of SWDA; or (2) liability to Massachusetts arising under § 107(a) of 
CERCLA or under certain provisions of Massachusetts state law,169 
where that liability relates to response costs which predate the con-
sent decree or to any of the following list of conditions existing at the 
site as of the date the consent decree was entered: "(a) soil contami-
nation which does not cause or contribute to groundwater contamina-
tion; (b) air contamination; and (c) groundwater contamination, where 
it results from the presence of benzene and toluene."17o 
The covenants not to sue take effect once the settling defendants 
have reimbursed the EPA and Massachusetts for response costs and, 
as to the Mark-Phillip Trust, once the trust has conveyed its property 
to the Custodial Trust.171 As regards "Future Liability," however, the 
covenants not to sue do not apply until (1) the EPA has certified 
completion of the remedial action; and (2) Massachusetts has con-
curred in the certification. l72 "Future Liability" arises when conditions 
at the site, previously unknown to the EPA or Massachusetts, are 
discovered after the entry of the consent decree, or when the EPA or 
Massachusetts finds, based on new information, that the remedial 
work is no longer protective of human health and the environment.l73 
The effect of postponing the application of the covenants not to sue 
to "Future Liability" is that the scope of the remedial work may be 
expanded at any point prior to the EPA's certification of completion, 
with the settling defendants being jointly and severally liable for all 
additional response costS.174 
166 ld. at *76. 
167 I d. at *78-*85. 
168 ld. at *78. 
1691d. at *80-*81. See supra note 125 for list of pertinent state law provisions. 
170 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *80-*81. 
171 ld. at *78. 
172 ld. at *79. 
173 ld. at *78-*83. 
174 See id. 
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Even after the EPA has certified that the remedial work is com-
plete, the "Post-certification reservations" operate to allow the EPA 
and Massachusetts to institute proceedings against Monsanto and 
other settling defendants who own Industri-Plex property to perform 
additional response actions or to reimburse the United States and 
Massachusetts for response costS.175 The "Post-certification reserva-
tions," however, allow the EPA and Massachusetts to sue for perform-
ance or recovery of response costs only when conditions at the site, 
previously unknown to the United States, are discovered after the 
entry of the consent decree, or when the EPA or Massachusetts finds, 
based on new information, that the remedial work is no longer pro-
tective of human health and the environment.176 
B. The Remedial Trust Fund 
The consent decree requires that the settling defendants execute a 
Remedial Trust Agreement establishing the Industri-Plex Site Reme-
dial Trust Fund (Remedial Trust).177 The Trustee of the Remedial 
Trust manages the financial aspects of the remedial action.178 The 
settling defendants contribute money to the Remedial Trust, which is 
then disbursed by the Trustee to pay expenses incurred under the 
consent decree, including the expenses of administering the Remedial 
Trust, the Custodial Trust, and an interest-bearing escrow account.179 
The Trustee of the Remedial Trust is required to prepare periodic 
reports predicting expenses for the next 120 days and revealing the 
amount remaining in the Remedial Trust on the date of the report.180 
The settling defendants must contribute funds to the Remedial Trust 
to ensure that the remedial work proceeds as smoothly and efficiently 
as possible.181 
The Remedial Trust Agreement is attached as an appendix to the 
consent decree and is enforceable under the terms of the consent 
decree against each of the twenty-five settling defendants who signed 
the Remedial Trust Agreement.182 The settling defendants assume 
liability for any failure by the Remedial Trust to comply with the 
175 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *81-*84. 
176Id. 
177 I d. at *23-*24. 
178 Id. at *24. 
179Id. 
180 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *24-*25. 
181Id. 
182 Id. at *25. The Mark-Phillip Trust is not a party to the Remedial Trust Agreement. 
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terms of the consent decree.183 Notwithstanding the enforceability of 
the Remedial Trust Agreement against the settling defendants, the 
EPA and Massachusetts are not bound by the provisions of the agree-
ment and are free to change the allocation provisions in the agreement 
which dictate what percentage of the total costs of remediation each 
settling defendant must pay.184 
C. The Custodial Trust and the Interest-Bearing Escrow Account 
The Mark-Phillip Trust, at the time the consent decree was negoti-
ated, owned approximately 120 of the 245 acres within the Industri-
Plex site.185 Due to insufficient financial resources to pay its share of 
the remediation costs, the Mark-Phillip Trust agreed instead to trans-
fer to a Custodial Trust all the property it owned, operated, or man-
aged.186 In exchange for the transfer of this property, the EPA, through 
the terms of the consent decree, expressly released the Mark-Phillip 
Trust from any obligation to finance or perform the remedial work at 
Industri-Plex.187 The conveyances by the Mark-Phillip Trust provide 
reimbursement of costs that the settling defendants will incur, resolve 
liability of the Mark-Phillip Trust for costs incurred by the United 
States and Massachusetts before entry of the consent decree, settle 
certain claims between the Mark-Phillip Trust and the other settling 
defendants, and will fund future response costs associated with the 
Industri-Plex site.1ss 
The consent decree mandates the establishment of the Custodial 
Trust and of an interest-bearing escrow account to hold and distribute 
funds received from the sale of the Custodial Trust property.189 The 
Custodial Trust's duties with respect to the Mark-Phillip Trust prop-
183 Id. 
184 Id. 
185 Winograd interview, supra note 8. 
186 Id.; Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *28. The specific language regarding what property 
the Mark-Phillip Trust must transfer is as follows: 
the Mark-Phillip Trust shall give, assign, convey, deed, or transfer to the Custodial 
Trust all property, real and personal, tangible and intangible, including all money, fees, 
charges, revenues, assignments of interest, collateral or otherwise owned, operated, or 
managed by the Mark-Phillip Trust anywhere and in any form, or by any person acting 
on behalf or under the control of the Mark-Phillip Trust. 
Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *28. 
187 See Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *17. 
188 Id. at *29-*30. The Mark-Phillip Trust also agreed to assist the EPA, Massachusetts, and 
the settling defendants in any actions to ascertain or quiet title to, or to contest or obtain the 
release of any encumbrance on, the property transferred by it to the Custodial Trust. Id. at *30. 
189Id. at *26-*27. See supra note 137 for definition of Institutional Controls. 
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erty include: (1) to manage and maintain the property; (2) to inaugu-
rate the Institutional Controls; (3) to comply with the Institutional 
Controls; (4) to abide by the covenants to provide access to the prop-
erty; (5) to subdivide the property if necessary to facilitate sale; (6) 
to pursue potential purchasers and negotiate the terms of sale; and 
(7) to transfer the sales proceeds, less all necessary expenses, to the 
escrow account.l90 The Custodial Trust may not sell the Mark-Phillip 
Trust property until the EPA has issued a formal certification of 
completion of the remedial action, and unless the EPA and Massachu-
setts grant special permission to convey the portion of the site for 
which such a certification has not been issued.191 
Of the first $3 million of net proceeds192 from the sale of the Mark-
Phillip Trust property, ten percent will go toward the City of Woburn's 
claims for real estate taxes.193 In addition, the City of Woburn will 
receive ten percent of net proceeds in excess of $10 million, until the 
City of Woburn has received a total of $645,000.194 The amount remain-
ing after deduction of the reasonable costs of sale and the taxes owed 
to the City of Woburn is referred to as net value and will be distrib-
uted according to the following formula: (l) of the first $8 million of 
value, eleven percent goes to the United States as reimbursement for 
any remaining response costs which predated the consent decree;l95 
and the remainder goes to the settling defendants to defray remedia-
tion costs; (2) of any net value in excess of $8 million, up to and 
including a total value of $10 million, fifty percent is allocated to the 
settling defendants and fifty percent must be held in the escrow 
account for future response costs; and (3) of any net value in excess 
of $10 million, thirty percent goes to the settling defendants and 
seventy percent goes to the United States as reimbursement for 
response costs which predate the consent decree. If the United States 
already has been reimbursed for response costs, the amount remain-
ing must be transferred to the escrow account for distribution to the 
settling defendants.196 
190 [d. at *30-*31. 
191 [d. at *33-*34. 
192 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *33. "Net proceeds" means total sale proceeds less 
reasonable costs of sale. [d. 
193 [d. 
194 [d. 
195 According to the terms of the consent decree, these pre-consent decree costs should have 
been paid within thirty days after the entry of the consent decree. [d. at *65-*66. 
196 [d. at *35-*39. 
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Any net proceeds not allocated to the City of Woburn, the United 
States, Massachusetts, or the settling defendants will remain in the 
escrow account, with the principal and interest to be applied to any 
of the following categories of response costs incurred by the EPA or 
Massachusetts in the future: (1) costs incurred in deciding whether to 
implement further remedial action for groundwater or surface water 
contamination; (2) costs incurred by the EPA or Massachusetts in 
implementing any additional remedial action required under (l); (3) 
costs incurred by the EPA in performing the first two "five-year 
reviews" pursuant to § 121(c) of CERCLA;197 or (4) contribution to-
ward the cost of further remedial action, if it is determined within two 
years after completion of the second five-year review, that the com-
pleted remedial action is no longer sufficiently protective of human 
health or the environment.198 If neither the EPA nor Massachusetts 
decides that any further remedial action is required or if any required 
action is already funded, the escrow will terminate and the balance 
will be distributed to the settling defendants.199 
If the EPA, in consultation with Massachusetts and the settling 
defendants, decides that any Mark-Phillip Trust property is unsalable, 
the Custodial Trust will establish and fund a further trust to hold that 
property and to carry out any remedial measures on the property.200 
The settling defendants are jointly and severally liable for any failure 
by the Custodial Trust to comply with the terms of the consent decree.201 
D. Future Owners: How Does the Consent Decree Affect Them? 
According to the terms of the Consent Decree, an entity that ac-
quires an ownership interest in the Industri-Plex site from a settling 
defendant who owns property on the site or from the Custodial Trust 
is not considered a successor or assign.202 The new owner is simply a 
successor-in-title and, therefore, does not become liable to perform 
the remedial work required by the consent decree, provided that: (1) 
the new owner is not affiliated with, or related to, any of the settling 
197 CERCLA § 121(c) provides that where the EPA selects a remedy that involves leaving a 
portion of the hazardous substances at the site, the EPA must review the remedial action at 
least every five years after completion to ensure that it is still sufficiently protective of human 
health and the environment. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(c). 
198 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *38-*39. 
199 [d. 
200 [d. 
201 [d. at *36-*37. 
202 [d. at *13-*14. 
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defendants or the Mark-Phillip Trust; (2) the new owner acquires the 
property in a good faith, arms' length transaction for value; and (3) 
the new owner does not succeed to the prior owner's business.203 As 
a successor-in-title, any new owner-including the Custodial Trust-
will be obligated to carry out the Institutional Controls that run with 
the land and bind all successors-in-title.204 Those new owners who 
become successors-in-title prior to the "Inauguration of Institutional 
Controls"205 will be responsible for that aspect of the remediation.206 
One of the major purposes of the Institutional Controls will be to 
maintain the caps placed on the two hide piles and to maintain pre-
existing land caps such as parking lots which, while not constructed 
as part of the consent decree, are nevertheless vital to ensuring 
that hazardous substances are not exposed.207 1f any successor-in-title 
modifies or disturbs any cap, cover, or other ground-covering struc-
ture and thereby increases the cost to the settling defendants of any 
remedial work, the successor-in-title who caused the increased cost 
must reimburse the settling defendants for that cost.208 Additionally, 
successors-in-title assume the obligation to provide access to their 
property to the EPA, Massachusetts, the settling defendants, and 
their representatives and contractors where access is required to 
carry out the terms of the consent decree.209 
The provisions of the consent decree regarding successors-in-title 
and their obligations suggest that new owners of Industri-Plex prop-
erty will not be dragged unwittingly into the wide net of CERCLA 
liability.210 The consent decree, however, provides no guaranty to these 
future owners, since they are not parties to the consent decree.211 That 
this is the case is clear from the language of CERCLA itself: a consent 
decree does not affect "the authority of [the EPA] to maintain an 
203 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *13-*14. 
204 [d. at *42. 
205 "Inauguration of Institutional Controls" means "those activities ... necessary to make the 
Institutional Controls fully effective and binding [e.g., recording notices and covenants with the 
Registry of Deeds]" on each Industri-Plex property owner. [d. at *9. 
206 [d. at *42. 
207 Interview with Joseph Lemay, Project Coordinator, Environmental Protection Agency, 
Region I, in Boston, Mass. (Feb. 10, 1995). 
208 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *45. 
209 [d. at *53-*55. 
210 See supra notes 202-09 and accompanying text. 
211 The consent decree specifically states that "[n]othing in this consent decree shall be 
construed to create any rights in, or any cause of action by, any person not a party to this consent 
decree." Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *15. 
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action under this chapter against any person who is not a party to the 
[consent decree]."212 To bridge this gap and ensure that the land that 
has been remediated at a cost of millions of dollars will be returned 
to beneficial reuse, the EPA has revised its policy regarding the use 
of prospective purchaser agreements.213 The next section discusses 
the new policy and its application at the Industri-Plex site. 
V. INDUSTRI-PLEX: THE EPA's NEW POLICY ON 
PROSPECTIVE PURCHASER AGREEMENTS 
The EPA's Prospective Purchaser Agreement takes the consent 
decree one step farther and provides an explicit covenant not to sue 
between the EPA and the purchaser.214 In July, 1995 the EPA publish-
ed new guidance in the Federal Register regarding prospective pur-
chaser agreements and their scope of application.215 In this guidance, 
the EPA explained the demand and need for prospective purchaser 
agreements, the function of these agreements, and the new criteria 
governing their use.216 From the buyer's narrow perspective, the need 
for prospective purchaser agreements stems from the simple fact that 
nobody wants to be tagged with CERCLA liability: "[b]ecause of the 
clear liability which attaches to landowners who acquire property 
with knowledge of contamination, the Agency has received numerous 
requests for covenants not to sue from prospective purchasers of 
contaminated property."217 The need, however, is not only to appease 
the buyer, but to further broader regulatory and societal goals: "EPA's 
experience has shown that prospective purchaser agreements have 
also benefitted the community ... by encouraging the reuse or rede-
velopment of property at which the fear of Superfund liability may 
have been a barrier."218 The function, therefore, of prospective pur-
chaser agreements, is "to promote cleanup for the beneficial reuse and 
development of contaminated properties."219'fhe July, 1995 guidance 
sets forth new criteria to guide the approval of prospective purchaser 
212 CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9622(c)-{d)(I)(A). 
213 Announcement and Publication of Guidance on Agreements With Prospective Purchasers 
of Contaminated Property and Model Prospective Purchaser Agreement, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,792 
(1995) [hereinafter Announcement]. 
214Id. 
216Id. 
216Id. 
217Id. at 34,793. 
218 Announcement, supra note 213, at 34,793. 
219Id. at 34,792. 
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agreements.220 The criteria are slanted toward "expanding the uni-
verse of eligible sites."221 Accordingly, a site may be the subject of a 
prospective purchaser agreement where "the agreement results in 
either (1) a substantial direct benefit to the Agency in terms of cleanup 
or funds for cleanup or (2) a substantial indirect benefit to the com-
munity coupled with a lesser direct benefit to the Agency."222 The 
impetus for, and significance of, the new 1995 criteria is evident from 
the EPA's brief summary of its experience with prospective purchaser 
agreements under its former 1989 guidance: 
[d]uring the past several years, EPA has entered into a number 
of prospective purchaser agreements to enable purchasers to buy 
contaminated property for cleanup, redevelopment or reuse. The 
1989 guidance required the EPA to receive substantial benefits in 
terms of work or reimbursement of response costs that otherwise 
would not have been available .... EPA's experience has demon-
strated that prospective purchaser agreements might be both 
appropriate and beneficial in more circumstances than contem-
plated by the 1989 guidance. The Agency now believes that it may 
be appropriate to enter into agreements resulting in somewhat 
reduced benefits to the Agency through cleanup or response costs 
or in benefits that also may be available from other parties. These 
agreements in turn should provide substantial benefits to the 
community through the creation or retention of jobs, productive 
use of abandoned property, or revitalization of blighted areas.223 
The new guidance represents an overall shift in policy: the narrow 
policy of furthering the EPA's recoupment of costs has given way to 
a broader goal of ensuring that a parcel of land that is caught in the 
legal leviathan of CERCLA Ultimately is put to use in a manner that 
ensures maximum societal benefit.224 "These criteria are intended to 
reflect EPA's commitment to removing the barriers imposed by po-
tential CERCLA liability while ensuring protection of human health 
and the environment."225 
220 [d. 
221 [d. 
222 [d. 
223 Announcement, supra note 213, at 34,793. 
224 See id. In describing the benefit criterion that guides the use of prospective purchaser 
agreements, the EPA acknowledged that "its past practice of limiting prospective purchaser 
agreements to those situations where substantial benefit was measured only in terms of cost 
reimbursement or work performed may have decreased the effectiveness of this tool." [d. at 
34,794. 
225 [d. 
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Sites eligible to become the subject of a prospective purchaser 
agreement are those sites at which "an EPA action has been taken, 
is ongoing, or is anticipated to be undertaken by the Agency."226 This 
rule of site selection represents an expansion of the earlier rule, which 
excluded from consideration sites such as Industri-Plex where EPA 
action was ongoing or completed.227 In terms of practical application 
of this rule of site selection, the EPA instructs its personnel to con-
sider whether the prospective purchaser agreement will generate 
sufficient benefit to justify its use.228 The benefit, whatever form it 
takes, must be "substantial."229 The benefit criterion is satisfied where 
the EPA receives a direct benefit in the form of "a commitment to 
conduct the cleanup or to reimburse the EPA's cost of cleanup."23o 
Under the July, 1995 guidance, the benefit criterion also is satisfied 
where the EPA receives "some direct benefit," coupled with substan-
tial indirect benefit to the community.231 The EPA defined indirect 
benefit to include the following types of benefits: "measures that serve 
to reduce substantially the risk posed by the site, creation or retention 
of jobs, development of abandoned or blighted property, creation of 
conservation or recreation areas, or provision of community services 
(such as improved public transportation and infrastructure)."232 The 
second prerequisite to approval of a prospective purchaser agreement 
is that "the continued operation of the facility or new site develop-
ment, with the exercise of due care, will not aggravate or contribute 
to the existing contamination or interfere with the EPA's response 
action."233 Where the EPA predicts that the buyer's activities will 
exacerbate the existing contamination, the EPA generally will decline 
to enter into a prospective purchaser agreement.234 In some circum-
stances, a prospective purchaser agreement including restrictions tai-
lored to protect the remediated condition of the site may be an alterna-
tive.235 Under the third criterion for approval of a prospective purchaser 
226 [d. 
227 [d. at 34,793. 
228 Announcement, supra note 213, at 34,794. The EPA refers to the measurement of environ-
mental benefit as the "cornerstone of the Agency's evaluation process" of acceptable prospective 
purchaser agreements. [d. 
229 [d. 
230 [d. 
231 [d. 
232 [d. 
233 Announcement, supra note 213, at 34,794. 
234 [d. 
235 [d. 
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agreement, the EPA may not enter into a prospective purchaser 
agreement ifit believes that active use of the site would impose health 
risks on the surrounding community.236 Finally, under the fourth cri-
terion, a buyer who is a party to the prospective purchaser agreement 
"should demonstrate that it is financially viable and capable of fulfilling 
any obligation under the agreement."237 
If the buyer survives each of the levels of examination, the buyer 
may become a party to a prospective purchaser agreement.238 On 
January 29, 1996, the EPA published a proposal to enter into a pro-
spective purchaser agreement at Industri-Plex.239 Since the EPA al-
ready has provided for cleanup of Industri-Plex through the terms of 
the consent decree,24o the EPA is not looking for "a substantial direct 
benefit ... in terms of cleanup or funds for cleanup."241 Rather, the 
EPA is issuing the prospective purchaser agreement under the author-
ity of its July, 1995 policy242 which allows the use of prospective pur-
chaser agreements where "the agreement results in ... a substantial 
indirect benefit to the community coupled with a lesser direct benefit 
to the Agency."243 The indirect benefit is the regional transportation 
center that is planned for the site.244 Based on the proposed Industri-
Plex prospective purchaser agreement published by the EPA on Janu-
ary 29, 1996, the "lesser direct benefit" appears to be payment of 
$30,000 by the prospective purchasers to the Hazardous Substances 
Superfund,245 as well as an agreement "to abide by the institutional 
controls and to provide access to the property."246 
VI. INDUSTRI-PLEX AS A MODEL FOR OTHER SITES 
The Industri-Plex site, after it is ultimately transformed into a 
regional transportation center, will represent a model remediation 
effort because the site will achieve beneficial reuse.247 This result can 
236Id. 
237Id. 
238 Announcement, supra note 213, at 34,793-94. 
239 Settlement, supra note 14, at 2,824. 
240 See supra section IV. 
241 Announcement, supra note 213, at 34,794. 
242 Id. 
243 Id. 
244 See id; Kindleberger, supra note 1, at AI. 
245 Settlement, supra note 14, at 2,824. See supra note 23 and accompanying text for descrip-
tion of the Hazardous Substance Superfund. 
246 Settlement, supra note 14, at 2,824. 
247 See Kindleberger, supra note 1, at AI. 
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be attributed to careful planning and engineering by the EPA and to 
the EPA's willingness to make concessions to the future owners of the 
Industri-Plex property. The EPA's planning and engineering are rep-
resented in the 1989 consent decree. The concessions materialize in 
the EPA's July, 1995 policy on prospective purchaser agreements. The 
combination of the two agreements-the consent decree and the pro-
spective purchaser agreement-ensures that the final product is a 
remediated site that, through beneficial reuse, someday will cease to 
be just a "Superfund Site." The formula for success, however, appears 
also to depend on certain underlying "fortuitous circumstances," which 
would have to be present for the Industri-Plex model to be adopted 
at other sites. 
The consent decree, while primarily a vehicle to ensure financing of 
the cleanup and timely completion of the remedial work, contains 
certain terms that facilitate resale and reuse of the land. First, the 
consent decree imposes broad liability on the settling defendants.248 
Even after the EPA certifies that the remediation is complete, and 
the covenants not to sue become fully effective, the settling defen-
dants are not absolved of liability.249 The EPA and Massachusetts 
retain the right to force Monsanto and other settling defendants who 
own Industri-Plex property to perform additional response actions or 
to reimburse the United States and Massachusetts for response costS.250 
The broad liability imposed on the settling defendants and the pres-
ence of Monsanto, a well-financed party to lead the remediation, sug-
gest that the EPA will not need to pursue future Industri-Plex own-
ers for response costs. Monsanto represents one of the fortuitous 
circumstances: the fact that there is a well-financed defendant who 
agreed to lead the remediation effort and to incur enormous response 
costs may have made the EPA more amenable to truncating its list 
of potentially responsible parties through the proposed Prospective 
Purchaser Agreement. 
The condition of settlement imposed on the Mark-Phillip Trust-
conveyance of all of its property to the Custodial Trust-also furthers 
the plan for beneficial reuse.251 The direct effect of the conveyance is 
that the property is freed of ownership rights and simply is waiting 
in trust to be purchased. The indirect effect of the conveyance is that 
24B See supra section IV.A. 
249 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *81-*82. 
250 [d. 
251 See supra text accompanying notes 185--88. 
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it helps finance the remediation, making the settlement terms less 
onerous for Monsanto and reducing the chance that the EPA will seek 
to expand the pool of potentially responsible parties to include future 
owners of the remediated Industri-Plex property. Once the EPA has 
certified completion of the remedial work, the Custodial Trust may 
sell the 120 acres of Mark-Phillip Trust property.252 The sale of Mark-
Phillip Trust property will generate substantial revenues. These reve-
nues will be disbursed according to the formula set forth in the con-
sent decree: to pay back taxes owed to the City of Woburn, to reimburse 
the EPA and Massachusetts for their response costs, to reimburse the 
settling defendants for remediation costs, and to remain in the escrow 
account to fund any necessary additional remedial action.253 Because 
Monsanto stands to gain reimbursement for at least a portion of its 
response costs through the sale of the Mark-Phillip Trust property, 
Monsanto has an incentive to ensure that the remedial work is com-
pleted promptly and properly. Because residual profits from the sale 
of the property will be held in escrow until the EPA determines that 
no further remedial work is necessary, the EPA will not need to add 
potentially responsible parties to the original group of settling defen-
dants. 
The fact that the Mark-Phillip Trust was compelled to convey its 
property because of financial necessity is another fortuitous circum-
stance. Had the Mark-Phillip Trust been able to make a financial 
contribution, rather than an "in-kind" contribution, Monsanto would 
not have the opportunity to recoup a substantial portion of its re-
sponse costs and any future response costs would have to be entirely 
funded by out-of-pocket contributions by the settling defendants or 
by new owners of the property. 
The "in-kind" contribution by the Mark-Phillip Trust relates to 
other underlying circumstances that increase the likelihood of beneficial 
reuse of the Industri-Plex Superfund site-the location and nature of 
the land. First, Industri-Plex is situated in a desirable location where 
there is little property available for development. The fact is that 
absent CERCLA and the threat of liability, Industri-Plex would be 
prime industrial property. In addition, the site is industrially zoned 
and is serviced by an off-site water supply.254It is unlikely that Indus-
tri-Plex ever could be developed as residential property, since the 
252 Consent Decree, supra note 13, at *33-*34. 
253 See supra text accompanying notes 192-99. 
254 Winograd interview, supra note 8. 
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method of remediation will not remove every last ounce of contami-
nated soil from the site, but, rather, will cap the deposits of hazardous 
waste scattered throughout the site.255 Fortunately, owners of Indus-
tri-Plex property receive their water from an off-site source.256 There-
fore, even though hazardous waste remains at the site and could 
contaminate the groundwater if the Institutional Controls are not 
completely effective, contamination of the groundwater will not trans-
late into contamination of the water supply of Industri-Plex property 
owners. 
A responsible corporate purchaser who is looking to the property 
as a site for buildings and parking lots, rather than homes and parks, 
will not be deterred by the fact that some hazardous waste remains 
on the site and requires that the owner maintain a three foot layer of 
paving or some other cap on top of contaminated soil.257 The owner 
still may disturb the paving or other caps where excavation is neces-
sary for construction purposes as long as the owner takes special 
precautions to minimize human exposure to hazardous waste dur-
ing construction.258 Maintenance of the paving or caps, together with 
heightened safety standards where construction disturbs the caps, 
may impose some additional costs on the owners.259 These incidental 
costs will be balanced by the benefits of ownership of Industri-Plex 
property. Industri-Plex is located at the junction of Routes 128 and 
93, in close proximity to other industrial parks and to the City of 
Boston.260 The price of the property, however, will reflect not only its 
prime location, but the former status of Industri-Plex as a Superfund 
site and consequently will be lower than other similarly situated 
property.261 An owner who is willing to undertake the relatively small 
burden of maintaining institutional controls will be able to locate 
operations on prime industrial property, the price of which has been 
deflated due to the stigma of having been a "Superfund site." 
The final piece of beneficial reuse is the EPA's new policy on pro-
spective purchaser agreements. In its July, 1995 guidance, the EPA 
expanded the universe of sites to include sites where remediation is 
ongoing or completed. Additionally, the "substantial benefit" that the 
255 Id. 
256 Id. 
257Id. 
258 Id. 
269 Winograd interview, supra note 8. 
260 See ROD, supra note 74, "Site Location and Description." 
261 Winograd interview, supra note 8. 
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EPA must receive in exchange for the issuance of the prospective 
purchaser agreement may now take the form of a substantial indirect 
benefit to the community coupled with a lesser direct benefit to the 
EPA. This represents a concession by the EPA, because under the 
former policy the EPA only issued prospective purchaser agreements 
where the purchaser promised to finance or perform remediation at 
a contaminated site. In the case of Industri-Plex, however, the "con-
cession" is negligible, since the remediation is already funded at two 
levels: by the direct contribution from Monsanto and the other set-
tling defendants, and by the indirect contribution of the sale of the 
Mark-Phillip Trust property. The question remains, therefore, whether 
the EPA would be willing to enter into a prospective purchaser agree-
ment at a site which was ideally situated for beneficial reuse, but for 
which remediation was not fully funded. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Industri-Plex is, notwithstanding its classification as a Superfund 
site, valuable industrial property. The only obstacle to its redevelop-
ment is the potential CERCLA liability which adheres to any site at 
which there is, or has been, a release of hazardous substances. The 
Industri-Plex consent decree between the EPA, Massachusetts, and 
the settling defendants explicitly confers liability upon the settling 
defendants for ongoing and future response costs at the site. The 
proposed Prospective Purchaser Agreement between the EPA and 
future purchasers of Industri-Plex property explicitly relieves future 
owners of CERCLA liability for pre-existing contamination at the 
site. The combination of the two instruments, as applied to valuable 
industrial property, is sufficient to overcome developers' reluctance 
to purchase property at a Superfund site. 
